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Preventing the Melting of the Arctic Council:
China as a Permanent Observer and What It
Means for the Council and the Environment
BRIANNA WODISKE

What will an ice-free Arctic look like, and when it happens, will
environmental protection trump economic interests? With the Arctic ice
melting at record pace, the world’s superpowers are increasingly
jockeying for political influence and an economic position in the
Arctic.1 In 2012, the ice in the Arctic melted at a record rate, and some
scientists think that the summer ice could disappear within four years.2
The fact that nations have interests and high hopes in the Arctic is
“partly the result of the work of the US Geological Survey which
estimated that the Arctic could contain up to 30 percent of the
undiscovered gas reserves of the world and 13 percent of undiscovered
oil in the world.”3 One author opines that seeking Arctic carbon fuels is
“paradoxical” because these fuels have been, and still are melting the
northern ice.4
Further, “[o]f all Asian countries eyeing the Arctic, it is inevitably
China that provokes the most interest and, in some quarters, alarm,”5
due to the size of the country, its population, and its clear need to secure
1. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Race Is On as Ice Melts Reveal Arctic Treasures, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/science/earth/arctic-resources-exposed-bywarming-set-off-competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2. Brad Plumer, When will the Arctic be ice-free in the summer? Maybe four years. Or 40,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
20,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezraklein/wp/2012/09/20/when-will-the-arctic-be-ice-free-maybe-four-years-or-40.
3. Rob Huebert, Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic?, in CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC
ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 27, 29 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore &
Thomas H. Heidar eds., 2010).
4. James Graff, Arctic: The Fight for the Top of the World, TIME, Oct. 1, 2007, at 28, 34,
available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1663848-2,00.html.
5. Banyan, Snow dragons, ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 2012, at 46, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21561891.
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energy supplies and other resources. On May 15, 2013, China sought
and was granted permanent observer status to the Arctic Council, the
“main intergovernmental forum for the five countries on the Arctic
Ocean—America, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia—and three
others in the Arctic Circle (Finland, Iceland and Sweden).”7
This note will argue that China’s acceptance to the Council will
promote protection of the environment and provide a voice for other
non-Arctic states. Section I will lay out the law governing the Arctic
and China’s interest in the region. Section II will analyze the ways the
Arctic Council has looked at applications in the past. Section III will
look at China’s legal rights under the United Nations Convention of the
Law of Seas (UNCLOS). Section IV will make the argument for the
acceptance of China’s application for permanent observer status and
explain why it is important; and finally, section V will conclude by
looking at the implications of China’s acceptance and what role it will
play in the Arctic Council’s future decisions.
I. THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND CHINA’S RACE FOR A SEAT AT
THE ARCTIC TABLE
The United Nations Convention of the Law of Seas (UNCLOS) is
referred to as a “constitution for the oceans.”8 UNCLOS established that
“[e]very State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles . . . .”9 The convention also
gives each coastal State the sovereign rights to natural resources and
certain economic activities in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 10
The EEZ is the area of sea extending as far as 200 nautical miles from
the State’s coast.11 If a State wishes to establish outer limits of its
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast, it must make
a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS), whereby the limits shall not exceed 350 nautical miles off the
State’s coast or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Michael W. Reed, An Attempt to Unravel Charting and Publicity Requirements Imposed
by UNCLOS Article 16, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 3, 3
(Clive R. Symmons ed., 2010).
9. United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea art. 3, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
available
at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
10. Id. art. 56.
11. Id. art. 57.
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metre isobath, a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.12 The
CLCS’s twenty-one members, all of whom are experts in geology,
geophysics, and hydrography,13 make the final and binding
recommendations to the coastal state relating to the outer limits of its
continental shelf.14
“The first comprehensive effort to implement an Arctic-wide
regime dealing with the protection of the Arctic environment began
with the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).”15
With the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States) serving as parties, the
AEPS sought to identify Arctic environmental issues to develop plans
for managing and protecting the region.16 The Arctic States later formed
the Arctic Council,17 established by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996.18
The Council was established so that the Arctic States and the indigenous
communities could cooperate and coordinate the oversight of
environmental protection programs established under the AEPS.19 The
Council would also oversee and coordinate sustainable development
programs and encourage education about the Arctic.20 One big
limitation on the Arctic Council, however, is that the agreement is not
established as hard law through a treaty, which means that it is not
legally binding.21
Aside from the eight member states on the Arctic Council, there
are also permanent participants and observers. Observer status is open
to non-Arctic states, inter-governmental organizations, interparliamentary organizations, as well as non-governmental
organizations.22 There are permanent observers and ad-hoc observers,
the difference between the two is that only permanent observers are

12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. art. 76.
Id. Annex II, art. 2(1).
Id. art. 76(8).
Donald R. Rothwell, The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime?, 15
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 241, 247 (2008).
16. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1627, 1631-32
[hereinafter AEPS].
17. Rothwell, supra note 15, at 241, 247.
18. See generally Ottawa Declaration, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387, available at
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/5-declarations
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration].
19. Id. art. 1(a), (b).
20. Id. art. 1(c), (d).
21. See generally U.N. Charter.
22. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 18, art. 3.
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automatically invited to the Council’s meetings. 23 Permanent observers
have the right to observe the Council’s actions, attend meetings, and
contribute primarily through working groups.24 The Ottawa Declaration
establishes the criteria for status as a permanent participant as well as
the decision-making procedure for determining that status;25 the
declaration states that “[d]ecisions of the Arctic Council are to be by
consensus of the Members”26 and defines “Member” to include only the
eight Arctic states.27 This decision, made by consensus, can only be
undertaken after a “full consultation” with the permanent participants
such as the organizations of the Arctic indigenous peoples.28
The Ottawa Declaration however, lacks formalistic rules and
guidelines in granting observers status. Although permanent observers
do not have formal decision-making powers, they have more influence
with the Council,29 so observers are in a better position to be heard with
regard to the Council’s decisions. Having permanent observer status is
crucial for China to take part in the Arctic strategy and to preserve a
voice in matters dealing with how the Arctic will be protected or
exploited.
A. Why China Set Their Sights on the Arctic North
If China fails to implement a viable Arctic strategy, the country
could really be left out in the cold. One of China’s main interests in the
Arctic is the opening of the Northern Sea Route30 because it would
provide China with more direct trade routes.31 International shipping is
important for China’s economic development because 46% of its gross
domestic product (GDP) is shipping-dependent, which directly affects

23. Chris Irvine, China granted permanent observer status at Arctic Council, TELEGRAPH
(May 15, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10060624/Chinagranted-permanent-observer-status-at-Arctic-Council.html.
24. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC COUNCIL OBSERVER MANUAL FOR SUBSIDIARY BODIES 4, 5,
available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-maindocuments-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting [hereinafter OBSERVER MANUAL].
25. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 18, art. 2.
26. Id. art. 7.
27. Id. art. 2.
28. Id.
29. See OBSERVER MANUAL, supra note 24, at 3.
30. See Margaret Blunden, Geopolitics and the Northern Sea Route, 88 THE ROYAL INST.
OF INT’L AFF. 115, 125 (2012).
31. Id.
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China’s economy as a whole.32 Most recently, a Chinese icebreaker ship
became the first vessel to cross the Arctic Ocean, concluding a threemonth mission from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic via the Arctic. 33
By completing this mission, China sent a clear message about its
interests in the region.
Aside from China’s ability to trade more effectively, the Northern
Sea route has other geopolitical implications. For one, the desire for
peaceful shipping and the use of the Northern Sea route for commerce
purposes is directly linked to the strength of a country’s navy. 34 Thus,
the Northern Sea Route has great economic and geopolitical
implications for China.
There are vast amounts of untapped oil and gas as well as natural
resources in the Arctic.35 A total of seventeen surveyed sites found that
there could be up to 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the Arctic,
which would amount to 13% of the world’s undiscovered reserves. 36
Moreover, as to natural gas, it is estimated that there is around 47.3
trillion cubic meters of gas and 44 billion barrels of liquefied petroleum
gas in the Arctic.37 Since China is growing and developing at a rapid
pace, these resources would greatly benefit the country. Also, with
China as “the world’s largest importer of iron ore and copper, and [the]
second largest importer of hydrocarbons, it would be surprising if China
did not have an interest in the Arctic’s mineral and hydrocarbon
resources . . . .”38
Moreover, research on climate change is important to China.39
32. Joseph K. Spears, China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon, CHINA BRIEF
Mar. 18, 2009, available at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_009_6_01.pdf.
33. China’s Snow Dragon icebreaker makes 85-day voyage to become to country’s first
vessel
to
cross
Arctic
Ocean,
NAT’L
POST
(Sept.
28,
2012),
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/09/28/chinas-snow-dragon-icebreaker-makes-85-day-voyageto-become-countrys-first-vessel-to-cross-arctic-ocean/ [hereinafter First Vessel to Cross].
34. A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, 26-29
(Project Gutenberg eBook elec. book ed. 2004), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm#Page_26.
35. Christoph Siedler, Taking Stock of North Pole Riches, SPEIGEL ONLINE (Sept. 7, 2009),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-arctic-monopoly-taking-stock-of-north-pole-richesa-648197-druck.html.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Aldo Chircop, The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State, 7.1 CAN. NAVAL
REV. 9, 12 (2011).
39. See NAT’L CAPITAL BRANCH OF THE CAN. INT’L COUNCIL & MUNK-GORDON ARCTIC
SEC. PROGRAM, Interests and Roles of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic, Background Brief 4 (Oct.
2011),
available
at
http://www.opencanada.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/arctic_seminar_background_brief.pdf [hereinafter CAPITAL BRANCH].
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China has invested heavily in its marine research capabilities and has
even established research stations in the Arctic, largely due to rights
granted to certain nationals of other countries under the Svalbard
Treaty.40 Annually, China spends around £38.5 million (€49 million) on
polar research, which is approximately the same amount of money that
South Korea spends and considerably more than how much the United
States spends.41 China’s investment in Arctic research sends a clear
message to the world that it wants to help and also that it has the means
to do so.
Among other things, the icebreaker that made its expedition across
the Arctic Ocean earlier this year has:
[A] data processing center and seven laboratories with over 500sq
meters of working space, […] operational equipment, a freezer to
store samples, a low temperature cultivation room, a clean
laboratory, a marine biological laboratory, a marine chemical
laboratory, a geological laboratory, and a CTD winch, a biological
winch, a geological laboratory, and a hallow-section device of EK42
500 model.

With such strong interests and dedication to the region, China has
certainly made its case for its inclusion in the Arctic governance.
II. THE COLD SHOULDER OR A WARM SEAT AT THE TABLE? THE WAY
THE ARCTIC COUNCIL DETERMINED PERMANENT STATUS IN THE PAST
Currently, there is a lack of information on the Arctic Council’s
process in determining whether or not it will grant observer status to
various states throughout the years. However, the postponement of the
European Union’s status as an observer may provide some insight into
the Council’s thoughts.43 First, and perhaps most importantly, allowing
the European Union observer status would open up the option to a
whole range of other state and non-state actors to apply.44 Given the
40. Chircop, supra note 38, at 12.
41. MALTE HUMPERT & ANDREAS RASPOTNIK, FROM ‘GREAT WALL’ TO ‘GREAT WHITE
NORTH’: EXPLAINING CHINA’S POLITICS IN THE ARCTIC 3 (2012), available at
http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/files/2013/04/Long-Post-2.pdf
[hereinafter
HUMPERT & RASPOTNIK].
42. Magdalena Tomasik, The 5th Chinese National Arctic Research Expedition, ARCTIC
PORTAL, http://arcticportal.org/features/805-chinare5 (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
43. EU application to Arctic Council postponed, NORTH NORWAY (May 18, 2011),
http://www.northnorway.org/nyheter/847-eu-application-to-arctic-council-postponed [hereinafter
Application postponed].
44. Arctic Council, Kiruna Declaration, MM08 (May 15, 2013).
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structure of the current Arctic Council, an influx of applicants may not
have been something it was ready or even willing to address. This is
doubtful though in light of the most recent acceptance of India, Italy,
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and, of course, China as observers.45
The European Union decision was, at least partially, due to a
dispute between Canada and the European Union over a seal hunting
ban and the effects it would have on indigenous groups.46 Eva Aariak,
the premier of Nunavut, Canada’s majority Inuit territory, expressed
concerns that the European nations are working hard to counteract her
indigenous group’s way of life.47 Moreover, “[t]he Arctic Council . . .
was formed to promote co-operation and co-ordination and interaction
in regards to member states in the Arctic. What [the] European Union is
trying to do is not those.”48 Overall, it seems like the Arctic Council’s
decision to deny the European Union’s application was grounded in
politics rather than in any set procedure to examine the admittance of
new observers. The Arctic Council’s decision thus leaves room for a
more defined structure.
Alternatively, perhaps the deciding factors in the Council’s
decision to admit France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain,
and the UK as observers could provide the answer. The answer,
however, is less technical than one might hope. Like with the European
Union, the Arctic Council has great discretion and liberty to pick and
choose which countries or groups it wants to have more influence in the
Arctic.49 Therefore, in the event a country plans to seek or is seeking to
join the tight-knit Arctic family, it should avoid inflaming member
states.

45. Steven Lee Myers, Arctic Council Adds 6 Nations as Observer States, Including China,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-counciladds-six-members-including-china.html?_r=1&.
46. Clive Schofield & Tavis Potts, Across the Top of the World? Emerging Arctic
Navigational Opportunities and Arctic Governance 2009 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 472, 481;
Michael Byers, Circumpolar Challenges: An Ambitious Agenda for the Arctic Council, RIDEAU
INST. 21 (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ByersArctic-Council-pre-conf-report-web.pdf [hereinafter Circumpolar Challenges]; see also Kiruna
Declaration, supra note 44, at 48.
47. Nunavut premier wants EU barred from Arctic Council, CBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2009/04/15/arctic-council.html.
48. Id.
49. HUMPERT & RASPOTNIK, supra note 41, at 8.
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A. Recent Developments to Admitting Permanent Observers: New
Criteria Equals a Better Understanding
Despite a less than clear history of admitting observers, there are
some recent developments. At the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting in 2011,
the Council adopted the recommendations of the Senior Arctic Officials
(SAOs) on the role and criteria for observers to the Arctic Council.50
The adopted recommendations state that the Council will take into
account the extent to which observers:









Accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council
defined in the Ottawa declaration.
Recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in the Arctic.
Recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the
Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and
that this framework provides a solid foundation for
responsible management of this ocean.
Respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic
indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants.
Have demonstrated a political willingness as well as
financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent
Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples.
Have demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise
relevant to the work of the Arctic Council.
Have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support
the work of the Arctic Council, including partnerships with
member states and Permanent Participants bringing Arctic
51
concerns to global decision making bodies.

This new checklist to admitting observers may prove to be a
helpful tool for the Council in justifying either the admittance or the
exclusion of new members. Nevertheless, it will be a helpful tool that
the rest of the world can finally use as reference when looking at how
the Council makes decisions.

50. Klaus Dodds, Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-emption, Precaution
and Preparedness, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE
1, 248 (Thomas S. Axworthy, Timo Koivurova & Waliul Hasanat eds., 2012).
51. Id. at 170.
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III. CHINA, THE ARCTIC, AND THE LEGAL UPHILL BATTLE: EXAMINING
CHINA’S INTERESTS IN LIGHT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
China argued in the past that since the effects of climate change
will have an impact at the regional and interregional level, the external
actors from the Arctic should be allowed to actively engage in Arctic
discussions.52 To date, China adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic
developments, wary that active overtures may cause alarm in other
countries due to China’s size and status as a rising global power.53
Chinese officials stressed that China’s Arctic research activities remain
focused on the climatic and environmental consequences of the ice
melting in the Arctic.54 This stance by Chinese officials was likely an
attempt to quell any fears held by the Arctic states.
China is aware that although permanent observers do not have
voting rights, they do have an automatic invitation to Arctic Council
meetings and activities.55 With this understanding, China hopes to be
increasingly influential over the Council’s decisions.56 The Arctic
Council’s power granted under UNCLOS (that actively governs the
Arctic) is problematic for China. As discussed above, under UNCLOS,
the Arctic Council was delegated the authority to oversee the Arctic
region, the non-Arctic states have little to no role in the council’s
decision-making process.57 Therefore, while China will have a difficult
time establishing any “legal rights” to the Arctic per se, the country can
still help create a stronger regime that is more inclusive and conducive
to the times and bring many invaluable tools to the Arctic regime.
There is another less legal obstacle worth noting, as identified by
one author. The current international mechanisms are based on
“Western” values of freedom, equality, and democracy, creating
obvious discrepancies between the basic social system and ideology of
China.58 “As a result, China’s participation in international mechanisms
is restrained.”59 China should therefore be more open to Western views
52. See HUMPERT & RASPOTNIK, supra note 41, at 8.
53. Linda Jakobson, China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, STOKHOLM INT’L PEACE
RESEARCH INST. 2 (Mar. 2010), http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1002.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Linda Jakobson & Jingchao Peng, China’s Arctic Aspirations, STOCKHOLM INT’L
PEACE RESEARCH INST., at V (Nov. 2012).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 11-17.
58. David Curtis Wright, The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World, 8 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
19 (2011).
59. Id.
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and values as well as be more involved to advance their international
presence.60 In sum, while China faces some hurdles in finding a voice in
the Arctic north, it seeks ways to justify its position and propose
alternatives that could bring more power to the Council.
A. China’s Traditional View of their Place in the Arctic: The
Convention on the High Seas and Why it Matters
China traditionally justified its position in the Arctic by using the
Convention on the High Seas (“the Convention”). The Convention
establishes that the land beyond internal waters and the territorial sea
are free for all mankind.61 The law states that everything beyond the
EEZ and all continental shelves are part of the high seas; accordingly,
no one owns these seabeds.62 China, however, fears that the high seas’
water will shrink if all of the claims by Arctic states to the outercontinental shelf are deemed legal.63 It is estimated that about 88 percent
of the Arctic’s seabed would be controlled by the Arctic states if all of
the current and expected continental shelf claims were approved.64
Despite the possible setbacks for China if the continental shelf
claims are approved, Arctic states must realize that limiting non-Arctic
state participation may cause effects on the Arctic states in the future if
non-Arctic state cooperation is necessary.65
More importantly,
UNCLOS does not seem to address the issue of outsiders’ abilities to
use and exploit unclaimed portions of the Arctic because of the
loophole—the Convention.66 Therefore, China’s traditional view of its
place in the Arctic should not go unnoticed because other states might
utilize a similar view to assert a presence in the Arctic.
Additionally, it is particularly important for Arctic states and the
region’s aboriginal peoples to secure support from the rest of the
international community.67 It is important for the Council to recognize
that “some of the Arctic issues are trans-regional, such as climate

60. Id. at 21.
61. Convention on the High Seas art. 4, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200
(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
62. Yekini Abubakri Olakulehin, The Scramble for Arctic and International Law, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 6 (2007).
63. Jakobson & Peng, supra note 55.
64. Wright, supra note 58, at 34.
65. Aldo Chircop, Should Observer Participation In Arctic Ocean Governance Be
Enhanced, 7 CAN. NAVAL REV. 3 (2012).
66. See generally Convention on the High Seas, supra note 61.
67. Jakobson & Peng, supra note 55.
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change and international shipping, which involve the interests of nonArctic states.”68 It seems unfair and unwise to bar interested parties who
clearly have a stake in the Arctic as well as in the effects the Arctic will
have on the global community from its governance. In the end, the
Convention may offer another way for non-Arctic states to get involved
and the Council should be careful that the loophole not cost them their
relevancy.
Despite claims that China has taken more of a “wait-and-see
approach” to the Arctic, China has already begun developing an Arctic
strategy.69 Prior to the May 2013 acceptance, China invested in Arctic
research and tried to establish regional, political, and economic
partnerships to show their commitment to the region. 70 One example of
China’s efforts was marked by a Chinese head of state’s first visit to
Denmark.71 The Chinese prime minister also made trips to Iceland and
Sweden for the first time in decades.72
China also sought to establish “lucrative” trade deals with some of
the Arctic states73 to secure resources from the countries that border the
Arctic with the ability to exploit within their EEZ.74 Essentially, China
found other ways to secure their place in the Arctic in preparation for
the possibility that the Council would continue to ignore their pleas for
inclusion. The combination of the Convention and China’s ambitious
Arctic endeavors makes China an undeniable force to be reckoned with.
The Council could have used UNCLOS to their advantage if it
wanted to reject China’s application since the UNCLOS is “vague and
general.”75 This would provide the Council flexibility in articulating a
reason for China’s exclusion. In the end, however, it seems that the
68. Lan Lijun, H.E. Ambassador, Statement at Meeting Between the Swedish Chairmanship
of the Artic Council and Observers (Nov. 6, 2011), available at http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/392-observer-meeting-stockholm-6-nov2012?download=1509:china-statement.
69. China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, supra note 53, at 2, 9.
70. See generally China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic, supra note 53, at 9-11; Isabella
Mroczkowski,
China’s
Arctic
Powerplay,
DIPLOMAT
(Feb.
15,
2012),
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/02/15/chinas-arctic-powerplay/ (example of a
partnership made with Iceland).
71. Joyce Man, China vies for seat at council on arctic resources and trade routes, GLOBAL
POST
(July
31,
2013),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asiapacific/china/120629/arctic-council-oil-natural-resources [hereinafter China vies for seat at
council].
72. Id.
73. Rosenthal, supra note 1.
74. Olakulehin, supra note 62, at 8.
75. Wright, supra note 58, at 19.
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Council could not ignore China’s efforts any longer.
B. Treading Carefully: Arctic States Acting Any Differently Than China
in the South China Sea?
China had to be careful because a more assertive approach
regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic could have
undermined China’s position on its own rights and sovereignty in
contested maritime spaces like the South China Sea.76 China applies
very different approaches to defining a region as a territory in the South
China Sea as it does in the Arctic Ocean.77 Were the Arctic states really
acting any differently than China with regard to their claims in the
South China Sea?
China asserts claims over some small islands in the South China
Sea as well as claims to the surrounding EEZs of those islands.78 A few
islands qualify as falling within China’s 12-nautical mile territorial sea,
but a very small amount would qualify under UNCLOS as falling within
the EEZ or continental shelf.79 Despite these facts, China has now
claimed the entire South China Sea based on self-created rules.80
Nevertheless, China would likely have been upset if any of the Arctic
five did something similar.81
Because of the issues surrounding China’s claims in the South
China Sea, some Chinese officials, when discussing territorial
developments in the Arctic region, emphasized China’s respect for the
sovereign territorial rights of Arctic countries and reassured that China’s
interests in the region are benign and cooperative in nature.82 This was
an attempt to divert the attention away from their claims in the South

76. See generally Jane Perlez, Alarm as China Issues Rules for Disputed Area, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/world/asia/alarm-as-china-issues-rules-fordisputed-sea.html (describing generally the dispute in the South China Sea); Caitlin Campbell,
China and the Arctic: Objectives and Obstacles, U.S. CHINA ECON. AND SEC. COMM 8-9 (2012),
available
at
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-and-theArctic_Apr2012.pdf.
77. Wright, supra note 58, at 37.
78. Maj. Gen. PK Chakravorty, Disputes in the South China Sea, 27.4 INDIAN DEFENSE
REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the dispute in the South China Sea); see also Jon M. Van Dyke,
Disputes Over Islands and Maritime Boundaries in East Asia, in MARITIME BOUNDARY
DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 39, 62-65 (Seoung-Yong Hong
& Jon M. Van Dyke eds., 2009) (detailing the dispute in the South China Sea).
79. Wright, supra note 58, at 37.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Campbell, supra note 76, at 8-9.
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China Sea and to encourage Arctic states of their good intentions. China
had to avoid showing disfavor or indifference for the Arctic States’
claims to territory in the Arctic to secure their future there. Thus, China
had to find the perfect balance between showing interest and
commitment to the region and avoiding stepping on the toes of any
Arctic state in order to avoid drawing attention to their claims in the
South China Sea.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR CHINA’S ACCEPTANCE AS A PERMANENT
OBSERVER: BENEFITING FROM THEIR FINANCIAL WEALTH AND
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The Arctic Council and the future Canadian chairman faced a
tough decision in 2013 when deciding whether to accept China as a
permanent observer. Many factors played into the decision, factors
which will change the Council’s make-up forever. There are some
undeniable truths and realities that Arctic states had to face, but China
will likely prove to have a positive impact on the Council’s make-up
and future governance.
A. The Next Arctic Council Chairman: The Canadian Perspective and
What Their Role Was in Deciding China’s Application
Since May 2013, Canada has been the new chairman of the Arctic
Council, and it was a good time for Canada to voice its desire to foster
cooperation in the region.83 “[W]orking on building common ground
with China and taking its concerns and interests into account could
prove profitable inasmuch as China could, in turn, consider Canada’s
specific interests in the Arctic.”84 Canadian interests overlap with
China’s in “areas of research, environmental regulation of maritime
shipping, interpretation of maritime treaties, and the need to cooperate
and engage in multilateral mechanisms to reach an international
compromise on these issues.”85
Moreover, Canada and the United States are currently entangled in
a dispute over the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary, an area of
83. The Canadian Press, Canada focuses on development at Arctic Council: experts fear
wrong
approach,
CBC
NEWS
(Dec.
3,
2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2012/12/03/north-canada-arctic-council.html;
see
also Frederic Lasserre, China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation Potential for Canada?,
CAN. INT’L COUNCIL (2010) (abstract).
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id.
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approximately six thousand square nautical miles of sea area above rich
oil and natural-gas resources.86 With China on Canada’s side, Canada
could counter the United States’ refusal to recognize the Canadian claim
over the Northwest Passage.87 This could facilitate a dialogue between
nations about shipping rules and guidelines for the Arctic.88 Thus,
China could really prove to be more of a resource than a threat to
Canada.89
B. A Chilling Truth: What China Brings to the Table and Why the
Arctic Council Needs Them
One important contribution China offers is scientific research
capabilities. This is important because “cooperation amongst scientists
is one of the best ways to reduce the high costs of arctic research.” 90
China brings the following to the table: a research station – Huang He
Zhan – in Svalbard, Norway, which is well inside the Arctic Ocean in
the Barents Sea; three Arctic research expeditions planned over the next
three to four years; and intentions to build a new 8000 ton ice breaker
by 2013 in addition to its current vessel, the Xuelong-Snow Dragon, to
cruise the Arctic region to conduct various expeditions.91 It is
abundantly clear that China is willing to spend the money and invest in
researching the Arctic region.
A Danish diplomat and economist who did a recent study on the
rise of Asia said that even though Asia is “still in the catch-up phase
with regard to technology, innovation, invention and science,” it still
has a lot that can help foster growth.92 He also noted that Asia is in a
unique position because it is not worried about where to get money, but
rather how to spend the money available; “[n]ot only will Asia be the
world’s creditor, but Asia will take over a large part of global economic
activity. . . . Most of the new multinationals entering the list of the

86. Wright, supra note 58, at 30.
87. Id. at 37.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Rob Huebert, Canada and China in the Arctic: A Work in Progress, CANADIAN POLAR
COMM., available at http://www.polarcom.gc.ca/eng/content/meridian-newsletter-fallwinter2011-springsummer-2012-0 (last modified Jan. 3, 2013).
91. Muhammad Makki, China’s Quest for Arctic Access and Resources, J. OF ENERGY
SECURITY
(Apr.
19,
2012),
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=351:chinas-quest-forarctic-access-aamp-resources&catid=123:content&Itemid=389.
92. Dodds, supra note 50, at 229.
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world’s largest and most important enterprises will grow out of Asia.”93
This study proves that China will have the capital to invest in vital
and important projects in the Arctic. As the ice melts more rapidly each
year, the need for investing in Arctic research becomes even more
pressing. The world has yet to see the effects of climate change and the
Council would be wise to view China as an ally in fighting to protect
the people across the globe as well as finding sustainable solutions to
Arctic exploration and development.
China should not worry too much about contesting claims by
Arctic countries to extend their EEZs because offshore oil and gas is
expensive to find, extract, and transport, especially in an extremely
remote and often inhospitable region.94 Moreover, to be able to access
the Arctic’s resources, the Arctic countries will need the strong Chinese
markets as well as their massive amounts of capital.95 The Arctic states
were wise to warm to the undeniable truth that China has the wealth and
tools necessary to make the Council succeed.
Currently, all of the Council’s funding comes from voluntary
contributions by individual Arctic states.96 Under current practice, states
propose projects or identify working groups they wish to support, and
these governments then implement and fund them.”97 There are
problems with this voluntary method. Not all states give money to all
projects, and some states give more than others. 98 Therefore, under this
type of funding system, the more funding the merrier. China would be
able to pick projects it wants to pursue and could fund part, if not all, of
the research. This is extremely beneficial for such a haphazardly funded
organization.
China is also extremely concerned with understanding the current
and the future effects of the changing environment on the country’s
continent as well as on its domestic agriculture and economic
development.99 The research station in Svaldbard has been in operation
since 2004, and since 2009, Norway and China have had formal
dialogues regarding Arctic issues, identifying climate and

93.
94.
95.
96.
(1999).
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Circumpolar Challenges, supra note 46, at 22.
Id.
Evan T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 712, 718
Id.
Bloom, supra note 96, at 719.
Circumpolar Challenges, supra note 46, at 22.
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environmental issues as areas of mutual interest.100 By engaging China,
who is largely responsible for global emissions, the Council can make
the country more conscious of Arctic issues and help promote
negotiation and implementation of agreements to protect the Arctic
environment.101
With nearly 20 percent of the world’s population,102 falling slightly
below 1.5 billion,103 the effects of the melting ice will play a crucial role
in protecting the Chinese people and their livelihood. The Council
hopes that the more China researches and the more time China spends
in the Arctic, it will have fewer motives for a potential resource grab.
Ultimately, the benefits outweigh the potential costs of allowing China a
seat at the Arctic table.
Furthermore, the main criterion stipulated in the rules regarding
admitting observers is that the non-Arctic states or other organizations
must be able to contribute to the Council’s work.104 After looking at
China’s efforts and expenditures in the Arctic, it is clear that it can
contribute to the Council’s work. If, however, the Council finds any
activities at odds with the Council’s Declaration, it can suspend
admission.105
China has a lot of scientific capital; for instance, incorporating
their scientists into the Council’s Working Groups (“WGs”) and Task
Forces (“TFs”) will be an invaluable tool in advancing polar research.106
“The chief idea behind this arrangement is that the WGs should operate
as international research institutions, taking into account the quality of
the projects and researchers’ backgrounds rather than as an extension of
political organs.”107 The addition of the Chinese scientists will
strengthen the WGs and TFs and will likely produce new studies. This
will ultimately help protect the region and its resources more
effectively.
As discussed earlier, because of how funding works, if China finds
100. Campbell, supra note 76, at 4.
101. Terry Fenge, Canada and the Arctic Council: Our turn to conduct the Arctic orchestra,
POL’Y OPTIONS (Apr. 2012), http://archive.irpp.org/po/archive/apr12/fenge.pdf.
102. Wright, supra note 58, at 7.
103. Malcolm Moore, China’s ageing population: 100-year waiting list for Beijing nursing
home, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9805834/Chinas-ageingpopulation-100-year-waiting-list-for-Beijing-nursing-home.html.
104. Dodds, supra note 50, at 163-64.
105. Id. at 164.
106. Id. at 289.
107. Id. at 289-90.
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a certain area of research it wants to pursue and decides to lead the
project, it will likely fund most, if not all, of any given project. 108 This
would be extremely helpful in achieving the Council’s overall goals.
Moreover, without any funding, the voluntary funding cannot “suffice
in the future if the Council is to fully reflect an expanded mandate, carry
out its evolving agenda, implement a developing, expansive
communication and outreach program, and generally be more strategic
in outlook and operation.”109 The Council has a lot on its plate in the
coming years, and help from a wealthy nation like China will ultimately
help it achieve its goals.
C. Side Effects: Other Benefits of Having China at the Arctic Table
The acceptance of China to the Council will help relationships
among Arctic states improve, and may also foster bilateral trade and
investment relations.110 The economic possibilities could also trickle
down to other states and indigenous groups in the region. Similarly, as a
major trading nation, China can bring the cost of goods down with the
possibility of opening a shorter shipping route across the top of the
world.111 It is estimated that the opening of the Northern Sea Route, the
route across the Arctic, could save China between $60 billion to $120
billion dollars annually.112 Of course, this could bring the cost of
Chinese goods down for states that purchase from them. Additionally,
in choosing to admit China and potentially opening the door for more
permanent observers, the Council is broadening awareness about Arctic
issues and their goals.113 It is likely that there are other factors that play
into the Council’s decision.
China is also the world’s largest fishing nation, and although
Arctic states can regulate fishing within 200 nautical miles of their
shores, they cannot do so on the High Seas.114 The regulation for areas
beyond the 200 nautical miles is only facilitated through regional

108. Bloom, supra note 96, at 718.
109. Fenge, supra note 101, at 66.
110. Lasserre, supra note 83, at 15.
111. Spears, supra note 32.
112. Michael
Byers,
The
dragon
looks
north,
AL
JAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/20111226145144638282.html (last modified
Dec. 28, 2011).
113. Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North,
45 POLAR RECORD 73 (2009) (discussing the possibility of an Arctic Treaty) [hereinafter Whither
the Arctic?].
114. The dragon looks north, supra note 112.
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fishery organizations.115 The United States would like to create a
regional fishery organization for the Arctic Ocean before commercial
fishing begins there, and China might prove helpful in efforts to do
so.116 China already works well with several regional fisheries
organizations and in return, China is provided fixed quotas of fish
stock.117 Therefore, China provides valuable contacts, relationships and
knowledge about creating a strong organization.
Fortunately, the aforementioned benefits of including China in the
Arctic Council as a permanent observer were not overlooked or
underestimated because the Council admitted China as an observer on
May 15, 2013.118 This is a step in the right direction because countries
such as China are the ones that the Council needs on their side, working
vigorously and tirelessly to meet the challenges of today. Postponing
China’s application would have only delayed the inevitable fact that the
Council needs to admit new members in order to strengthen their power
and international authority. China is, therefore, a gateway into a new
way of Arctic governance.
V. HOW WILL THE ARCTIC COUNCIL ADDRESS FUTURE ARCTIC
APPLICATIONS?: THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING CHINA A SEAT AT THE
TABLE
With China as a new permanent observer, how should the Arctic
Council address future applications and pleas for admission? The
Council should be more open-minded to a new configuration of the
Council and should use China’s acceptance as a way to build a stronger
Arctic Council. Oran Young puts it best, “what is needed to maintain
the Arctic as a zone of peace is a more effective governance system for
the region.”119 China provides the perfect opportunity for this shift.
Also, the Council frustrates their own purpose by refusing to let
non-Arctic states be a party to Arctic discussions and governance. To
advance its mission, the Council needs to garner support and gain
international recognition and authority, not upset non-Arctic actors. The
most effective way to achieve that is to find a place for various
interested parties and work together to find solutions to Arctic concerns.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Kiruna Declaration, supra note 44, at 6.
119. Oran R. Young, Review Article The Future of the Arctic: Cauldron of Conflict or Zone
of Peace? 87 INT’L AFF. 192 (2011).
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Therefore, if the Council had decided to refuse China’s application, it
would not only have lost its wealth and research capabilities, but may
also have suffered from severe political ramifications.120
History suggests that China does not take rejection very well or
lightly, so it is unknown how this decision would have played into their
121
thought process and subsequent relations elsewhere around the world.
Norwegian Arctic policy expert Lunde said he was “a bit afraid, for
instance, that if China is continuously denied access, it will be more
difficult for the responsible people in leadership to discipline all the
players that might become more irresponsible in their attitudes towards
122
Arctic cooperation.”
In essence, China’s application could have
affected Arctic relations as well as other international efforts.
China has contributed greatly by stepping up and getting involved
in the Arctic. “China has spoken for the global commons in ways that
no other major state has done in recent times.”123 Essentially, China has
become an advocate for the area within the High Seas as remaining part
of common heritage of mankind and therefore, is acting as a guardian
for the interests of developing countries who may not yet have the
resources to contribute to the Arctic.124 Admitting China as a permanent
observer will cause a ripple affect throughout developing countries and
will likely give them similar access to the Arctic when they are prepared
to become more involved.
A. Avoiding an Arctic Council Meltdown: The Future and Strengthening
of the Council
If the Arctic Council can garner more international cooperation, as
it did through admitting China, then it will open the door to sharing
research and knowledge among many different groups and state
actors.125 This could prove to be beneficial in finding a more sustainable
solution to Arctic governance, since more people would be working
towards the solution. Moreover, China’s presence and participation as
an observer will strengthen the “legitimacy, authority and effectiveness

120. Levon Sevunts, Canada’s delicate balancing act at Arctic Council: ‘Yes’ to China, ‘No’
to EU, EYE ON THE ARCTIC (Jan. 25, 2013), http://eyeonthearctic.rcinet.ca/canadas-delicatebalancing-act-at-arctic-council-yes-to-china-no-to-eu/?lang=en.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The Emergence of China as a Polar-Capable State, supra note 38, at 14.
124. Id.
125. Dodds, supra note 50, at 244.
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of the Arctic Council.”126
There has also been much discussion about whether the Arctic
Council is and will be effective, regardless of attempts to strengthen the
regime. Some argue for an Arctic Treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty
because it would create a “hard law” regime.127 The Antarctic Treaty is
legally binding and has protected the Antarctic since the mid-twentieth
century.128 The main goal was to promote research and avoid a land grab
by states.129 This type of treaty, if implemented in the Arctic, might
force the “coastal States to stop and think about whether they really
want to despoil one of the last pristine places on the planet.”130
However, others argue that an Arctic Treaty is not the most
effective way to address Arctic issues.131 First, the Arctic is very
different from the Antarctic because Antarctica is surrounded by land,
as opposed to the Arctic, which is surrounded by water.132 Also, people
live on the Arctic.133 Furthermore, the US and Russia would never
agree. Accordingly, strengthening the current regime would be much
more effective.134 Thus, for the time being, it may be best to work with
what we have rather than undertake a completely new endeavor
considering the difference in the regions.
“Geographically, the sheer distance of the Antarctic from other
countries diffuses the interests of any one nation, while the Arctic
Ocean directly abuts the territory of individual nations and the Arctic
region includes territories of several sovereign nations.”135 Also, the
Arctic is different from the Antarctic because it not only deals with state
actors, but indigenous groups and other non-states actors.136 So, the
Arctic faces different challenges than that of Antarctica, not only
because surrounding states have more of a national interest in protecting

126. Id.
127. Brent Carpenter, Warm is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil, UNCLOS Article 76, and
How an Arctic Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War, 39 ENVTL. L. 215, 251 (2009); see also Erika
Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the Legal Regimes in the Arctic and
Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 32, 35 (2008); Whither the Arctic?, supra note 113.
128. Lennon, supra note 127, at 32.
129. Id. at 33.
130. Carpenter, supra note 127, at 251.
131. Whither the Arctic?, supra note 113, at 75.
132. Ioana Georgescu, Arctic Geopolitics-Time for a New Regime, INSTITUT EUROPEEN DES
HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 13 (2010).
133. Id.
134. See Georgescu, supra note 132, at 82.
135. Lennon, supra note 127, at 35.
136. Whither the Arctic?, supra note 113, at 76.
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their piece of the Arctic pie, but because of the important role that nonstates actors play.137 These are realities that must be acknowledged and
addressed accordingly.
Authors Liu and Yang gave four reasons for expressing similar
pessimism as described above: first, Antarctica is a continent and the
only piece of land in the world without a sovereign whereas in the
Arctic, there are several states with territorial sovereignty, exclusive
economic zones, and continental shelves; second, article 234 of
UNCLOS already addresses ice-covered sea areas, and UNCLOS is
widely applied in the Arctic region; third, many bilateral and
multilateral agreements pertaining to the Arctic have already been
concluded under the influence of UNCLOS, including AEPS; and
fourth, the Antarctic is a non-militarized region whereas nuclear
weapons are present in the Arctic, the most militarized region in the
world.138
However, to strengthen the Arctic Council, the Arctic Eight must
sacrifice some control over their natural resources139 because “in
considering the long-term benefits from an intact Arctic environment,
the costs of sacrificing certain economic resources are minor.” 140 The
Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in 2011 was a step in
the right direction because the Council proposed a number of concrete
measures with regard to climate change and environmental protection;
the Council also adopted guidelines regarding the role and criteria for
admitting observers, as discussed previously.141 This demonstrates the
Council’s commitment to using its power more effectively and also
signals the Council’s willingness to modify existing guidelines and
openness to change.
One way the Council could strengthen their internal structure
would be to move away from its current mandate of environmental
protection and sustainable development to instead focus on a greater
number of issues such as fisheries and marine mammals as well as
political and security-related support.142 “This could allow a better
137. Id.
138. Wright, supra note 58, at 27.
139. Melting Boundaries: Rethinking Arctic Governance, (2011), THE SCHOOL OF INT’L
STUDIES
U.
OF
WASH.
47
(2011),
available
at
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/16482/Task%20Force%2
0A%202011.pdf?sequence=1.
140. Id.
141. Dodds, supra note 50, at 248.
142. Id.
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division of labour between the Working groups.”143 Again, this would
all help increase the Council’s legitimacy and authority. Furthermore,
there should be a person responsible for media relations to both increase
the Council’s visibility and educate the public about Arctic issues.144
Several reports have already recommended a number of procedural
improvements that Canada should pursue during its time as Chairman.145
Suggested improvements include: developing funding arrangements to
promote the fuller participation of indigenous peoples; holding Arctic
Council ministerial meetings every year instead of every other year;
developing a common Canada-US agenda for the two countries’
successive chairmanships (2013-2017); and encouraging the Arctic
Council to recognize the special roles played by regional, state, and
territorial governments in Arctic governance.146
The hurdle to achieving a restructured and strengthened Arctic
Council will be the Arctic states themselves,147 since each state wants to
pursue their own national interests above those of the global
community.148 The acceptance of China and other states149 however,
signals an effort by the Council to be more cooperative and inclusive,
which in turn may have averted a catastrophic Arctic Council
meltdown.
B. Leading Up to China’s Acceptance
Prior to the decision on May 15, 2013, the Canadian government
noted that although the “current informal nature [of the Arctic Circle] . .
. has served Canada well for many years . . . the growing demands on
the organization may require changes to make it more robust.” 150 The
United States also has a similar view whereby it would allow for
updating aspects of the Council.151 The Scandinavian countries are the
most receptive to opening up the Council to new members and
observers.152 The aforementioned evidence is important because it
143. Id.
144. Id. at 270.
145. Circumpolar Challenges, supra note 46, at 1.
146. Id.
147. Dodds, supra note 50, at 271.
148. Id.
149. Myers, supra note 45.
150. Government of Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad (2010), available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/assets/pdfs/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf.
151. Dodds, supra note 50, at 273.
152. Sevunts, supra note 120.
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signals that some Arctic members are open to change and provides a
glimmer of optimism.
Now you may be wondering what was the actual likelihood of the
Arctic Council accepting China as a permanent observer. The director
of the department for international and strategic studies at the China
Institute of International Studies thought that China had a “50-50
chance” of becoming a permanent observer.153 In reality, the decision
would be determined by a multitude of factors starting in the capitals of
other Arctic powers, “notably Norway, Sweden and Russia.”154
Sweden wanted the China application decided by May 2013.155
Norway clashed “with China over the awarding of the Nobel Peace
Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiabo,” and Russia had not shown that it
was warming to the idea of China joining the Council as a permanent
observer.156
It has been said, however, that China “wooed the Arctic Council”
at the January 22, 2013 Conference of the Arctic in Tromsø, Norway. 157
On January 21, Zhao Jun, a Chinese ambassador to Norway, said in a
keynote speech that, “China believes the Arctic Council is the most
important international forum for discussions about environmental
protection and sustainable development in the Arctic.”158 This likely
reassured the Arctic Council who was visibly concerned about opening
up the Council to more members. It was important that the Council see
new members, like China, as assets rather than enemies.159 China
provided the perfect opportunity to look towards a newer and more
formidable Arctic Council that could more effectively govern the
treasures of the Arctic.
Though stated in the context of the Cold War, Gorbachev’s famous
Murmansk Speech of 1987 still applies to the modern Arctic landscape:
The Arctic is not only the Arctic Ocean, but also the northern
tips of three continents: Europe, Asia and America. It is the
153. China vies for seat at council, supra note 71.
154. Brian Flemming, China’s Arctic Council bid will test us, STAR PHOENIX (Sept. 14,
2012), http://www2.canada.com/saskatoonstarphoenix/news/forum/story.html?id=d4ff8ae4-8c244763-88ee-e1114e60e55a.
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. China, Korea, EU woo Arctic Council at Norway conference, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (Jan.
22,
2013),
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674china_korea_eu_woo_arctic_council_at_norw
ay_conference/.
158. Id.
159. Flemming, supra note 154, at 2.
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place where Euroasian, North American and Asian Pacific
regions meet, where frontiers come close to one another and
the interests of the states belonging to mutually opposed
160
military blocs and nonaligned ones cross.
The community and interrelationship of the interests of our
161
entire world is felt in the northern part of the globe.
So even at this point in history, Gorbachev was correct about how
interconnected the Arctic is with many different continents and with
many divergent views.
C. The Current State of Affairs
As mentioned previously, during the May 15, 2013 ministerial
meeting in Kiruna, the eight Arctic Council members granted
permanent observer status to China, India, Japan, South Korea,
Singapore and Italy.162 However, the European Union will not become a
permanent observer until it has resolved some final disagreements with
Canada concerning the import of seal products.163 Despite the possibility
that the European Union could decide to intentionally frustrate the
Council’s goals because it is upset that it was not granted status, it will
probably just continue to seek a resolution with regard to the seal
product ban since it is so close to gaining the acceptance it so
desperately seeks. Additionally, the Council agreed on a new manual
that will govern the activities and roles of the observers.164 The
European Union will not be able to directly raise issues but will have to
bring them forward through one of the eight core members.165 This
manual was important for the eight Arctic states in reasserting their role,
and stood as a reminder to the new observers of their place at the Arctic
table.
Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, affirmed the idea that the
addition of the observers strengthened the Council, stating that, “[b]y
160. Mikhail Gorbechev, Gen. Sec’y of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Speech in
Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin
and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk (Oct. 2, 1987).
161. Id.
162. Myers, supra note 45, at 1.
163. Clive Schofield & Tavis Potts, Across the Top of the World? Emerging Arctic
Navigational Opportunities and Arctic Governance, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 472, 481
(2009).
164. See generally OBSERVER MANUAL, supra note 24.
165. Id. at 5.
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being observer[s], these organizations and states, they accept the
principles and the sovereignty of the Arctic Council on Arctic issues.” 166
Additionally, Mr. Carl Bildt thinks that the expansion further
strengthens the Council’s international clout and influence.167
VI. CONCLUSION
There must exist a perfect balance in the Arctic between exploring
new opportunities and addressing environmental concerns. This is
especially true because:
The Arctic is the world’s last continuous and unexploited
region, being highly unique in terms of its landscape, having
an increased proportion of continental shelves, a low level of
sunlight, extremely low water temperatures, presence of
permanent sea-ice cover, and its indigenous peoples168and
ecosystems, as well as its vulnerability to climate change.
China offers the Council a shared interest in learning about and
finding ways to protect this precious environment. It also has the
wealth, scientific tools, and capabilities to assist the Council in
achieving these environmental goals. Those same tools and capabilities
can also be used to discover ways or programs for sustainable
development in the region. Moreover, it will be better for the Council to
have big international players like China on their side in order to gain
international influence and to avoid losing their influence altogether.
Further, “[i]n an increasingly interdependent world, in both the
economic and the ecological senses of the term, the idea of international
cooperation is not just an ideal but an imperative.”169 The problems that
face the Arctic are not for the Arctic states to handle alone. The effects
and implications of a warming Arctic and the governance of the region
will reach to all corners of the globe, and the Council should not miss
the opportunity to get more hands and heads in the game.
Overall, the decision to admit China was a complicated one with
many political and economic effects. There are passionate advocates on
both sides and the decision was ultimately decided by a privileged few.
Aside from the Council now having China on their side, it will face
many legal questions as it moves forward in trying to pursue building a
stronger and more formidable system to govern the Arctic. The

166.
167.
168.
169.

Myers, supra note 45, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Georgescu, supra note 132, at 19.
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decisions made by the Arctic Council will have national and
international effects because the unknown effects that this melting
region will pose to states and to people. Hopefully, China can start the
discussion and encourage the debate about the future of the Arctic.
China will inevitably play an important role in international affairs
across the globe as its population grows in numbers, power, and wealth.
The Council was wise in recognizing the ability to create a mutually
beneficial relationship with this rising super power.

